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Abstract
Security testing and assurance in the automotive domain is challenging. This is
predominantly due to the increase in the amount of software and the number
of connective entry points in the modern vehicle. In this paper we build on
earlier work by using a systematic security evaluation to enumerate undesirable
behaviours, enabling the assignment of severity ratings in a (semi-) automated
manner. We demonstrate this in two case studies; firstly with the native Blue-
tooth connection in an automotive head unit, and secondly with an aftermarket
diagnostics device. We envisage that the resulting severity classifications would
add weight to a security assurance case, both as evidence and as guidance for
future test cases.
Keywords: automotive, Bluetooth, cybersecurity, security assurance,
penetration testing
1. Introduction
Historically, embedded systems were designed to operate in tightly-controlled
environments which required specialist knowledge to design, calibrate and de-
ploy. Developments in functionality and connectivity, however, have meant that
the amount of software and its concomitant complexity has increased dramati-
cally.
There are several trends which have contributed to the automotive threat
landscape, each of which lead to increased attack surface area and increased
complexity, which impairs testability:
• Firstly, the presence of an increased volume of software (measured, for
example, in lines of code) to meet the requirements of an increasingly
sophisticated functionality and attendant rise in the number of processing
units. This leads to compounded complexity. There are more lines of
code within some of the more advanced luxury vehicles than a fighter jet
[1]. Subsequently, testability and auditing (and in this context, security
testing) becomes more difficult and the likelihood of large numbers and
the severity of vulnerabilities increases [2].
• Secondly, there has been significant development and integration of (wire-
less) communication interfaces, which means more connectivity. Subse-
quently, this has led to increased number of connections in the intra-
vehicular network as reuse of externally provided information becomes
more important. There is also a concomitant rise in the number of exter-
nal peripheral devices that can now connect to the vehicle. This means
that there are now more access points for malicious attackers, and also
potentially negatively impacts system boundaries by blurring them, or
extending them to beyond the control of original manufacturers such that
unknown interactions (and therefore possible security risks) could exist.
• Finally content volume, variability and value has changed and increased,
which means that there is more data about the vehicle to extract. Ad-
ditionally, the data that is extracted is potentially more valuable if it is
personal data that is obtained. In summary, there is more of and more
kinds of data to consider and defend.
Security engineering (and security testing as part of that process) is still
relatively novel in mainstream automotive production [3, 4], and typically se-
curity is incidental and a by-product of achieving performance and safety goals
[5, 6, 7, 8]. Even with advanced formal methods for modelling and testing,
the need for and number of demands, features and increased connecting power
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means that, even had security been considered, the scale of the problem facing
security testers is now much broader [9].
There are challenges to introducing a security engineering process into the
automotive industry. Vehicles are heterogeneous with many variants and con-
figurations. Production costs are based on units, with narrow profit margins.
There are differences between life and development cycles to traditional com-
puting software and hardware. Supply chains adds to the level of obscurity with
each tier with regards to the final system [2].
More specifically, securing interfaces in vehicles also comes with many issues.
Any security mechanism will require additional processing overhead, and on the
hardware level, has ramifications in provision of energy and in physical assembly
and design, such as placement of additional wiring.
Even should such concerns be addressed, countermeasures that are com-
monly used currently for large and complex systems are not suitable for vehic-
ular embedded systems because of hardware constraints and the differences in
network configuration. Well-established defences at software level such as the
use of cryptography, firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDS) cannot be
implemented without considerable change in architecture due to the use of suf-
ficiently different protocols and topologies within the automotive domain, and
the potentially costly computational power required. Post-release, maintenance
becomes an issue as patches for discovered vulnerabilities, unless performed
over-the-air, are difficult to apply once units are sold.
Although the vast majority of demonstrated attacks that have been directed
at the vehicle use automotive-specific vectors, many of the methods are familiar
to security professionals. This includes the use of malware and known software
vulnerabilities, proximity extending hardware, replay attacks or simply reverse
engineering messages to gain illicit knowledge of the system [8]. Considering the
similarity of attack methods, parallels can be drawn between non-automotive
and automotive systems, forming a baseline from which to draw information on
possible weaknesses.
All of the above is dependent on acquiring knowledge and information re-
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garding existing vulnerabilities. From the number and variety of reported
threats, weaknesses and exploits (see Section 2), all of which have been demon-
strated as feasible, it is clear that a methodical description of the problem, as
well as a systematic method of establishing relative priority regarding risks and
threats, is required. Furthermore, manual methods, whilst useful, can be time-
consuming. This is similar to the problem facing those who are addressing vehi-
cle safety; however, the process of evaluation in vehicle safety is well-established.
We endeavour to address the problem in vehicle security in a similar fashion,
using industry standards and to aid in the automation of the process.
The main contribution of this paper is the semi-automated classification of
results using security severity ratings (in line with industry standards), resulting
from a systematic security evaluation of automotive Bluetooth interfaces. We
present two case studies, one which evaluates a native automotive Bluetooth
interface, and one which evaluates a aftermarket Bluetooth-enabled device at-
tached to the vehicle’s on-board diagnostics port.
The evaluation is from a black box perspective. This is because, although
there are high-confidence formal methods for security testing (see Section 2),
the primary barrier to using such methods is that the information required to
do so is not available, both due to commercial confidentiality and the obscurity
of sub-components within the system (many of which are third party)[10]. This
also precludes other methods of enabling systematic evaluation such as attack
graphs, for which formal model checking could be performed.
Thus, we use a black box approach to test the case study systems (see
experimental applications in Section 4), and we build here on our earlier work
[11], by including severity classifications as part of the overall systematic security
evaluation. These classifications can inform the selection of future test cases,
and can act as evidence within a security assurance case.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows:
• We explore related work, including the exposure of vulnerabilities in ve-
hicles, comparative methods and severity classifications in Section 2;
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• We present our methodology together with the fundamental concepts that
underlie it in Section 3;
• We briefly outline the implementation of our methodology as a proof-of-
concept tool in Section 3.4;
• We present the results of two experiments, one in which we apply our
experimental application to the Bluetooth in an infotainment unit and one
where we study an aftermarket on-board diagnostic device) in Section 4;
• We look at how the results could be used in a security assurance case in
Section 5 and finally,
• We discuss implications, give concluding remarks and explore future di-
rections of research in Section 6.
2. Related Work
In this section, we discuss security testing in the automotive domain, with a
brief overview of vulnerabilities exposed and the necessity for systematic security
testing (Section 2.1). We then explore comparative methods and schemes that
allow for a security classification or assurance with the results of such testing in
Section 2.2.
2.1. Security Testing
Many initial studies looking at automotive security have been exploratory,
with demonstrated attacks on the vehicle as a whole [8, 12], on components or
sub-components [13], on the intra-vehicular network [14, 15] or on peripheral
devices that connect to the vehicle such as through the On-Board Diagnostics
(OBD-II) port [16, 17].
These papers established the nature of vulnerabilities and are impressive
in their depth of experimentation. They make clear the need for a systematic
testing method that would help highlight the problems an engineer must address.
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A systematic security evaluation method has many advantages. There is a
disparity between what an attacker must find in order to exploit the system (po-
tentially just one vulnerability) and the number of flaws a defender would have
to safeguard in order to protect the system (as many as possible). An ad-hoc
approach to finding vulnerabilities could mean that bugs and weaknesses are
overlooked [18]. A methodical approach increases the likelihood of determining
the nature and number of problems [19]. The latter is essential since informa-
tion sharing is still limited due to the competitive nature of the industry [20].
Systematic analyses can also be supported by a variety of tools and utilities (as
is the case in this paper) and be further expanded upon once more information
regarding the system is known.
Comparative methods include model-based security testing [19], model-driven
engineering [21] or using “anti-models” [22] or abuse cases [23] to achieve system-
atism. What these all have in common, however, is the need to have pre-built
models (or enough technical information to generate a trustworthy model) in
order to run or generate any test cases.
2.2. Automotive Specific Severity Classifications
The “E-Safety Vehicle Intrusion Protected Applications” (EVITA) project
[24] ultimately aims to provide a secure architecture for automotive on-board
networks and evaluates the realisation of this using two “views”. The first of
these is the magnified view. Of especial interest within this are the automotive
specific systematic methods of evaluation described. Attack tree modelling (dis-
cussed further in Section 3.2) is used to support these processes. Of particular
interest is the classification of the severity of various outcomes (Table 1).
Severity levels have also featured in other automotive security projects, such
as the “Healing vulnerabilities to enhance software security and safety” (HEAV-
ENS) project [25]. This project is aimed at facilitating security requirements
engineering. It uses the popular threat modelling method STRIDE (a mnemonic
for Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of Service,
Elevation of Privilege) [26] for threat analysis, ending with the assignment of
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Table 1: EVITA Severity Classification for Automotive Security Threats
Severity
Classes
Classes of harm to stakeholders
Safety (Ss) Privacy (Sp) Financial (Sf ) Operational (So)
0 No injuries No unauthorised
access to data
No financial loss No impact on
operational
performance
1 Light or
moderate
injuries
Anonymous data
only
Low-level
financial loss
Operational impact
not discernible to
driver
2 Severe and
life-threatening
injuries (survival
probable) or
light/moderate
injuries for
multiple vehicles
Identification of
vehicle or driver
Moderate
financial loss, or
low losses for
multiple vehicles
Driver aware of
performance
degradation, or
indiscernible
operational
impacts for
multiple vehicles
3 Life threatening
(survival
uncertain) or
fatal injuries, or
severe injuries
for multiple
vehicles
Driver or vehicle
tracking, or
identification of
driver or vehicle
for multiple
vehicles
Heavy financial
loss, or moderate
losses for
multiple vehicles
Significant impact
on operational
performance, or
noticeable
operational impact
for multiple
vehicles
4 Life threatening
or fatal injuries
for multiple
vehicles
Driver or vehicle
tracking for
multiple vehicles
Heavy financial
losses for
multiple vehicles
Significant
operational impact
for multiple
vehicles.
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risk levels based on threat, impact and level of security needed [27]. Its sever-
ity levels are similar to EVITA’s, in both structure and content, and forms an
alternative example of an automotive risk assessment framework.
EVITA and HEAVENS are both referenced in SAE J3061, the Cybersecurity
Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Systems [28], which provides a framework of
recommendations for establishing a cybersecurity engineering process within an
organisation. The high-level framework for these process recommendations is
aligned with that used in the automotive functional safety standard ISO 26262
[29], which is itself based on the well-established systems engineering V-model.
Within that framework, J3061 suggests engineering processes that are suitable
for security engineering, which among others include threat modelling, attack
trees, vulnerability analysis and penetration testing. These key recommended
process steps of J3061 are of particular relevance to the subject of this paper.
3. Methodology
We begin by describing our workflow in Section 3.1. We then discuss the
methods involved in our workflow in subsequent sections (Sections 3.2 and 3.3)
before reporting on our implementation of the process using Bluetooth as a case
study (Section 3.4).
3.1. Workflow
The high level workflow can be seen in Figure 1. We expand on what the
steps are, the methods used to achieve them and the outputs of each step in the
following sections:
• In Section 3.1.1, we cover threat modelling, which we perform manually;
• In Section 3.1.2, we outline the semi-automated penetration testing pro-
cess;
• In Section 3.1.3, we briefly describe the assignment of severity classifica-
tions (this is also semi-automated); and
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Threat modelling
Built over existing knowledge of
threats
Threat driven penetration
testing of the system
Penetration tests derived from
attack trees
Assignment of severity clas-
sifications
SAE J3061 Severity Classifications
Construction of evidence
based security assurance
case
Validation by automotive experts
Output: scripted attack tree
Output: evidence of security
related system behaviour
Output: severity classifications
for body of evidence
Output: security assurance case
Figure 1: Workflow of Methodology
• In section 3.1.4, we give details regarding the security assurance case con-
struction.
3.1.1. Threat modelling
We perform threat modelling first, by creating attack trees based on prior
knowledge and reconnaissance. This is a manual process based on expert judg-
ment. The process is described in more detail in Section 3.2. The attack trees
are captured in a particular format, which leads to the first output: a scripted
attack tree that reflects possible penetration tests, and that also serves as input
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into the next step.
3.1.2. Threat driven penetration testing of the system
We then used penetration testing (as detailed in Section 3.3) using a semi-
automated test execution tool (Section 3.4). The penetration tests are derived
from the attack trees (see Figure 2); each test is a combination of the leaf nodes
(attack steps) of the attack tree depending on the logic gate at the root of each
branch. Results were acquired regarding system behaviour from a security per-
spective in a semi-automated fashion. Since this is an implementation-specific
step, further details on methods used to test (i.e. gain evidence from) the case
study interface of Bluetooth is given in Tables 2 and 3.
Testing
Penetration tests
derived from attack
tree
System-under-test
Results
Figure 2: Penetration testing process
3.1.3. Assignment of severity classifications
The outcomes of systematic tests were assigned severity ratings (see Sec-
tion 3.4.2 for case-study specific details). This assignment takes place based on
several factors:
• Whether the result is a positive one (presence of information), or whether
it was a negative one (no information acquired, but the test was run
successfully)
• In the case of the latter, the assigned rating for each category is always
zero. If the test was not possible, the assigned rating is also always zero,
although rationale might differ.
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• In the case of the former, questions are asked of the tester to record
manual observations (see Section 3.4.2 for specific questions relating to
Bluetooth). These guiding questions are based again on the rationale
provided by EVITA in Table 1 and help form the ratings of 1, 2 or 3. The
rating of 4 is used only in relation to multiple vehicles being affected at
the same time; with none of the test vehicles being interconnected, the
rating of 4 was never needed.
3.1.4. Construction of evidence based security assurance case
The construction of the assurance case is manual, but conforms to recom-
mendations as outlined in SAE J3061.
SAE J3061 recommends that a cybersecurity case or assurance case is de-
veloped prior to release for production. The assurance case is analogous to a
safety case and is used to document, through the provision of argumentation
and a body of evidence, that a certain claim holds about the security achieved
by the developed system [30]. An example of a claim could be: “freedom from
unreasonable risk of an attack has been achieved”
This claim may be supported by a number of sub-claims which are further
supported by arguments and associated evidence, such as the ones provided in
our case studies in Section 5. Such a sub-claim could be based on the results of
systematic security testing of the implementation, with the methods presented
earlier used to acquire the evidence to support this sub-claim.
Therefore, having built our framework such that a systematic evaluation
was possible, we also required a way to make the results of such an evaluation
meaningful. In this paper, we use severity levels (as outlined in Table 1) to form
ratings that could be used in a security assurance case.
Only the privacy (Sp) and operational (So) aspects of the EVITA classifi-
cation scheme were considered. Safety (and safety analysis), being a significant
topic in itself, was considered out of scope for this paper due to financial and
informational constraints.
The financial category was also not considered due to two challenging fac-
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tors. Firstly, the financial aspect could encompass the severity of loss through
financial transactions within the vehicles, a feature that is not yet widely de-
ployed and was not present on any of the vehicles tested. Secondly, the financial
rating could also be due to severity of loss through theft of the vehicle. However,
there is no definitive real world detection measure or tool to determine whether
a vulnerability led to this theft, even should the vehicle be recovered.
Finally, having no information regarding internal paths or interfaces pre-
cludes us from formal verification and validation. There are also no set of
expected outputs in the given context of automotive systems, since vehicular
experimental analysis has typically concentrated on other technologies. Thus,
this severity classification was validated by two domain experts.
3.2. Attack Trees
We use attack trees as our threat modelling method (see Section 3.1.1) to
provide systematism. Attack trees are conceptual diagrams created to represent
the actions of an adversary looking to fulfil an attack goal. These goals can be
as low level (compromise an interface) or high level (steal money) as required.
Logic gates connect the branches and leaves of the attack tree. The AND
logic gate (also known as conjunction) requires that all leaves of a branch are
complete before an attack is considered complete. The OR logic gate (also
known as disjunction) requires that at least one of the leaves of a branch is
complete before an attack is considered fulfilled [31]. Several other extended
logic gates could also be used. In this study, sequential AND (SAND) is also
used to denote an AND logic gate that requires temporal order. These trees
can be represented as diagrams (Figure 3) or textually (Figure 4).
The trees used in this paper follow the broad outline (Figure 5) of the pen-
etration testing process as described above. We populated the leaves of the
attack trees manually with background research that had been performed on
the case study interface Bluetooth (detailed in Section 3.4).
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Figure 3: Example diagrammatic attack tree detailing the opening of a safe [11]
Figure 4: Example textual attack tree detailing the opening of a safe [11]
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Figure 5: Board outline of attack trees used in this paper
3.3. Penetration Testing
This form of testing is a specialised form of security testing, and is the
method used in the second step of our methodology (see Section 3.1.2). Ulti-
mately, the aim of a such a test is to enumerate exploitable vulnerabilities and
potential weaknesses depending on the scope and authorisation to carry out
such a project. This is performed using a series of activities from an attacker’s
perspective. Activities are not usually prescribed, although there are methods
and processes common in each test run regardless of the technology or system
being tested (such as enumerating a network or machine address).
Although there are formal technical standards, there are drawbacks to ap-
plying them in this case. For example, ISO/IEC15408 has high informational
needs about the testing environment, which is not suitable for an opaque sys-
tem. Others (such as ISO/IEC 27001 on information security management)
only address part of the whole challenge. Nevertheless, recognition of the fact
that there had to be a broad common approach resulted in the proposal of the
Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) [32]. Although named as such,
PTES is not a formal standard, but rather a technical methodological guideline
to provide optimum test coverage; this, however, means that there is still a lack
of a globally accepted methodology for penetration testing [11].
The advantage to these guidelines is that, although there is lack of a concrete
consensus on what constitutes a flaw, weakness or vulnerability, the process can,
at least, be loosely categorised and ordered around:
1. Scoping, whereby scope, objectives, aims and ground rules are established
and agreed to between all stakeholder parties,
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2. Information gathering or reconnaissance, which involves a back-
ground study on the test subject looking for all possible weaknesses,
whether that be through user, developer or system documentation, pub-
licly available manuals, source code or results of previous testing. This
process can be passive (listening for information) or active (probing in or-
der to acquire a response) depending on the aim of the test. An example
of this could be profiling the Bluetooth module or chip, where the NAP
and UAP information could be used to identify the manufacturer (a list
is publicly available in IEEE’s Standards Register [33]).
3. Formation of vulnerability hypotheses, which involves constructing
hypotheses of possible vulnerabilities in the system, determined via study
of background information gathered as well as by looking at abuse cases,
4. Threat modelling which involves the generation and modelling of pos-
sible threats based on potential vulnerabilities identified,
5. Testing and exploitation, which is used to establish the presence of the
vulnerability, determining the nature of the flaw, whether it is repeated
through the system and its security impact,
6. Clean up and report, which involves creating or collating recommenda-
tions for discovered flaws. These are then presented, along with a cleanup
of the system to ensure that no inadvertent flaws from penetration testing
(such as malware or backdoors) are left behind.
The categorisation above is not necessarily a step-by-step process. Each
stage (or series of stages) can be re-iterated as needed for the system or com-
ponent being tested; threat modelling for example may uncover a breadth of
testing that might not necessarily be in scope, which would mean re-visiting or
re-writing the scope in order to match any constraints more accurately.
Although a mass of information has been acquired regarding tools, tech-
niques and to some extent, motivation (in terms of attacker goals and what
they hope to gain), the issue of prioritisation and the combination of circum-
stance that would result in the use of this tool or that attack method can be
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covered by scenario building around an attack goal. In this paper, the latter is
covered through the building of attack trees (see Section 3.2).
Of the steps above, scoping and information gathering as well as vulnerability
hypotheses were inherent in the processes used to build the tailored attack
trees that are seen later in experimental application (see Section 4). Direct
reconnaissance of a specific implementation, testing, exploitation and reporting
are embodied in the software implementation of the attack tree (see Section 3.4)
and are reflected in its key features (Section 3.4.1).
3.4. Implementation
A software tool was designed and created to aid in the systematic evaluation
process. This forms part of the threat driven penetration testing process as de-
scribed in Section 3.1.2. This proof-of-concept tool was developed using Python
2.7, on a Kali Linux machine, with a Cambridge Silicon Radio Bluetooth 4.0
dongle attached. The tool incorporates and extends earlier Bluetooth testing
tools [11]. The general architecture of the tool is given in Figure 6.
3.4.1. Key Features
As described above in Section 3.3, the features of the tool (and the methods
which enable those features) can be categorised broadly into:
• Reconnaissance, which can be defined as a survey of the system’s exis-
tence, configuration and capabilities (Table 2),
• Connection attributes, which includes information on pairing mecha-
nisms, transmission sizes and connection state (Table 2), and
• Attack goal, which encompasses methods that would allow the realisation
of the attack goal (Table 3);
• Reporting, including logs of all data gathering and tests run (Table 3),
parameters chosen by the tester (where appropriate) and the severity clas-
sification. All are also for use as evidence in the security assurance case.
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} For use as evidence in the security assurance case
Figure 6: General architecture of the tool
Each of these categories is an individual component (with the individual
attack steps forming sub-components). The attack goals in this case were two
examples of the attack classification as described by [34] and are in line with
the general accepted security testing goals of violating confidentiality, integrity
or availability (CIA).
This structure allows for different permutations (depending on the attack
tree desired), and for extensibility; new attack methods can be added as steps (as
sub-components) within each module. New attack goals that come within test
scope can also be added to the tool as a different module. Since the beginning of
every security test begins with an inspection of the system, the reconnaissance
module can likewise be re-used at the beginning of every test run.
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Table 2: Proof-of-concept tool features (expanded version from [11])
Feature Method
R
ec
o
n
n
a
is
sa
n
ce
(A) Discovery of ‘discoverable’ de-
vice addresses
Inquiry scans for available Bluetooth addresses
(A) Discovery of ‘hidden’ devices Brute-force scanning (incrementing the address
bits by one before sending an inquiry). Requires
pre-knowledge of the first three bytes of the Blue-
tooth address (OUI) - or other address bytes to be
feasible.
(A) Determination of device manu-
facturer
Using the OUI to scan through a database of stored
OUIs (from IEEE’s standard register [33])
(A) Determination of Bluetooth chip
manufacturer
Using device information supplied by bluez
(S) Retrieves FCC ID information Retrieves relevant Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) web link if ID is known by user
(A) Determination of service profiles
offered by device
Using the Service Discovery Protocol (SDP)
(A) Preliminary indication of device
operating system (OS)
Using indicators in discovered service profiles
(S) Determination of whether device
uses legacy pairing
Checks Bluetooth version (version 2.0 or before
means that legacy pairing is in use, whilst version
2.1 or above means that use of either legacy pairing
or Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) is possible)
(A) Determination of open ports Sending information to all possible RFCOMM and
L2CAP ports and awaiting the appropriate re-
sponses
(A) Determination of filtered ports Sending information to all RFCOMM and L2CAP
ports and filtering for specific error messages
C
o
n
n
ec
ti
o
n
A
tt
r
ib
u
te
s
(A) Determination of pairing status With reference to local paired devices list
(S) Pair or unpair the device as ap-
propriate
With reference to local paired devices list, subject
to appropriate authentication
(S) Spoof a device Calls to installed spooftooph[35] package
(A) Checks for presence of OBEX
File Transfer Profile (FTP) service
With reference to discovered service profiles
(A) Checks for presence of OBEX
Push Profile (OPP) service
With reference to discovered service profiles
(A) Determines maximum transmis-
sion unit (MTU) for open L2CAP
ports
Sending increasing size of packets until Bluetooth
error 90, message too long appears
(A) = fully automated, (S) = semi automated, requires manual intervention
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Table 3: Proof-of-concept tool features (continued) (expanded version from [11])
Feature Method
A
tt
a
c
k
G
o
a
l
D
a
ta
E
x
tr
a
c
ti
o
n (S) Attempted extraction of informa-
tion from headunit
Using “attention modem” (AT) commands through
open RFCOMM ports
(S) Attempted extraction of informa-
tion by browsing headunit filesystem
Mounting the filesystem on a “Filesystem in
Userspace” (FUSE) based filesystem type (if
OBEX FTP exists)
(S) Attempted extraction of informa-
tion
Using the dot-dot-slash (../) attack to attempt di-
rectory traversal beyond the given restricted direc-
tory (if OBEX FTP exists)
D
o
S
(A) Attempted denial of service Flooding open L2CAP ports with L2CAP echo re-
quests
(S) Attempted denial of service Repeated data push through OBEX channels
(S) Attempted denial of service Pushing of malformed data through any RFCOMM
channels
V
e
h
ic
le
C
o
m
p
ro
m
is
e
(A) Extract vehicle specific informa-
tion
Vehicle information based on AT commands sent
to an attached wireless Bluetooth-enabled OBD-II
device
(S) Attempted extraction or denial of
service
Through injection or flooding using OBD-II proto-
col messages (see Section 4.2). User specifies pa-
rameters such as type and number of messages and
time intervals
(S) Attempted vehicle compromise Through injection or flooding using raw pre-
determined CAN messages (see Section 4.2). User
specifies CAN header ID, CAN data payload, num-
ber of messages to be sent and time intervals
(A) Vehicle data extraction Passive monitoring of all exposed CAN buses on
the OBD-II port
O
u
tp
u
ts
(A) Scan logs Written to CSV or TXT files and collated at the
end of the test run
(A) Populated attack tree Displayed and logged with results of the test run
(A) Subtrees Where test results have not been found or entered,
denoted by NULL, appropriate subtrees (found using
width-first search) will be displayed and logged.
(S) EVITA Severity classifications For each result in combination with answers to
tester queries, a severity classification based on the
“privacy” and “operational” categories (see Sec-
tion 2.1) is given.
(A) = fully automated, (S) = semi automated, requires manual intervention
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3.4.2. Severity Classification
After tests are performed, questions were asked of the tester to record manual
observations. Note that these are to assist in the severity classifications (as
outlined in Section 3.1.3). Although the name and characteristics of the service
profiles are determined in an automated manner, a human may be required to
categorise. For example, categories such as ”Vendor Specific Profiles” would
require a human to assess with background research whether they were indeed
specific to the target system vendor, or whether they were instead specific to a
platform such as Android Auto, or to the Bluetooth version implemented on a
target system.
These questions include:
• Service profiles and its nature:
– Were there profiles that are named suggestively?
– Were there vendor specific profiles?
– Were there synchronisation profiles?
– Were there Personal Ad-Hoc Network (PAN) profiles?
Certain service profiles mean that personal information can be synchro-
nised between two devices, which might impact privacy. Others may offer
more access to the system itself, either by broadening the attack surface
(such as by allowing Ethernet packets through e.g. through the PAN pro-
file) or bespoke services which may have implementation flaws. Suggestive
profiles (such as “Reflash Server” may help narrow the scope or provide
a target for an adversary. These affect the privacy rating and potentially
the operational rating.
• PIN behaviour:
– Was the PIN dynamic?
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– Was the PIN customisable by user?
– Was the PIN easily guessable?
Each of these questions (depending on a positive or negative answer) would
affect the risk of an adversary being able to compromise the Bluetooth con-
nection through, for example, eavesdropping. In the worst case scenario
of a static, fixed and easily-guessable PIN, the risk would be far greater
than if the PIN had been dynamic or customisable. This would affect both
operational and privacy ratings.
• Data returned by the vehicle:
– Was there information about the vehicle returned?
– Was there information about the user of the vehicle returned?
These questions would affect the privacy ratings given, with the latter
being the highest severity.
• The behaviour of the vehicle during testing:
– Was there discernible operational impact on the system during test-
ing?
– Was there a reaction on the user interface?
These questions were both used to discern the impact on the system, and
whether any alerting effects resulted. This affects the operational rating during
classification.
The combination of answers were used in conjunction with the findings of
the tests to generate tabulated ratings for each aspect of the test suite. Ratings
given to each of the test findings are labelled ‘ACT’ (for actual). Furthermore,
a potential severity level is also given (denoted by ‘POT’).
The rationale for ACT and POT ratings is hard-coded into the tool. This is
possible for the ACTUAL ratings, since EVITA provides concrete and discrete
rationale for each rating.
21
The POT ratings are based on worst-case scenarios should an exploit or
attack be possible, or if a part of the system is inherently weak. An example
of this is an unchangeable short PIN, which in the worst case would allow an
attacker to compromise authentication with all the attendant risks. All are also
tied to the rationale outlined by EVITA.
Each rating is given as Spi, Soi where Sp represents the privacy severity
rating, and So the operational severity rating and where i ∈ {0− 4}.
The tool also checks through the tree to give automatic ratings. For exam-
ple, where there is no OBEX FTP, the mounting and traversal attacks were not
performed. This would automatically result in an Sp0 and So0 rating. Other
aspects such as vehicle tracking through the Bluetooth address (which affects
privacy), and whether there were open ports (which potentially affects opera-
tions) are pulled from the logs created on the findings and and also classified
automatically.
3.5. Extension of Methodology
We have used part of the methodology described above in our earlier work
[11]. This includes the threat modelling aspect (outlined in Section 3.1.1) and
the penetration testing aspect (Section 3.1.2). In this paper, we have expanded
in the breadth of application by:
• Expanding on the number of attack trees. This is synonymous with enu-
merating more attack goals. In this paper we add Denial of Service and
Vehicle Compromise, embodied in a software tool (see Section 3.4) ;
• Adding an additional vector through which vehicle compromise could take
place (i.e. compromise through the diagnostics port using an aftermarket
device) (see Section 4.2);
We have also extended the workflow of the methodology itself by:
• Adding to the methodology the assignment of severity levels to results of
the systematic evaluations. The severity level assignment process and how
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this could contribute to a security assurance case is also discussed above
(Sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4).
• Experimental application of this new step in the workflow. This is de-
scribed in Section 5.
4. Experimental Application
We use the Bluetooth interface as a case study for our experimental appli-
cation. The reason for this is its ubiquity in automotive systems, whether that
be in-cabin (via the infotainment system) or through aftermarket devices that
attach to the vehicle for diagnostics. All features of the toolset as described
in Tables 2 and Tables 3 were used to acquire the data as given below. The
exception to this is where a specific implementation is required (such as the
presence of an OBEXFTP service), and these are marked in the experimental
results in the following sections.
4.1. Experimental Methodology – Infotainment System
Two attack trees (Figure 7 and Figure 8) with the attack goals of data
extraction and denial of service were predetermined using Bluetooth techniques
and attacks described in literature.
Vehicles were stationary and ignition was switched on, ensuring that it was
within the Class 2 (ten metre) range as no antennas were used to extend range.
If Bluetooth had to be enabled, then this was performed before the tool was
run. The vehicle was a small hatchback from a major manufacturer registered
in 2013.
For this study, primarily “legitimate” connections were used, with legitimate
defined here as a straightforward connection to the vehicle from a mobile phone,
without any attempt to compromise the Bluetooth communications protocol.
The reason for this was that the aim of the study was to explore Bluetooth as
implemented on the vehicular system, rather than the Bluetooth protocol itself,
since the security (or lack thereof) of the Bluetooth pairing mechanisms and the
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underlying protocols are well studied [36, 37, 38, 39]. A connection compromise
would thus exacerbate the risk of malicious actions rather than introduce a
new risk. The latter is especially significant since there are no access control
policies on the vehicle, i.e. access to Bluetooth services implemented was not
differentiated by user, but rather by device. Every device had access to every
service (assuming compatibility, which is a different issue). There was no need to
compromise the protocol to elevate privilege or gain access to restricted areas as
might be the case with a more traditional computing system. The single caveat
to this was the use of a spoofed device (at the local testing interface), to observe
whether the vehicle accepted the connection.
4.1.1. Attack goals
Two attack trees (according to two attack goals) were created for testing on
vehicles. They are discussed below.
Data extraction. from a vehicle through Bluetooth is largely an exercise in gath-
ering as much information as possible. Although the most overtly valuable is
information regarding the user of the vehicle, data from the vehicle itself (such
as cornering speed, braking times and so forth) can be used to fingerprint drivers
[40].
Other information that may be of use include the age of the technology
(which may indicate legacy flaws), the chip manufacturer (which may point to
analogous vulnerabilities or bugs), pairing mechanisms (where aspects such as
using a fixed PIN might make a system more insecure) or other reconnaissance
data that could enable targeted attacks. The attack tree used for this attack
goal is shown in Figure 7.
Denial of Service. involves flooding and fuzzing, as jammers were not available
at the time of testing. The aim was to cause disruption to the vehicle or any
component therein, with the primary target being the headunit. Because of the
nature of denial of service, and because the system under test is a black box,
most of the results are based on observation whilst trying to perform normal
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Figure 7: Attack tree with data extraction as an attack goal (adapted from [11])
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Figure 8: Attack tree with denial of service as an attack goal
actions (such as making a phone call), or on what might happen on the graphical
front end, rather than anything being returned by the vehicle. The attack tree
used for denial of service is shown in Figure 8.
Results from applying the tool in accordance with both the attack trees as
given above, as well as implications of these results is given in Table 4.
4.2. Experimental Methodology – Aftermarket Device
The experimental application of the toolset involves the ”Vehicle Compro-
mise” attack goal suite as seen in Table 3. The four attempted data extrac-
tion or vehicle compromise tools correspond to the final SAND:Cause Vehicle
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Table 4: Experimental Results: Vehicle 1 [11]
Interface characteristics Observation
Address: xx:xx:xx:34:8A:2D
Version: 2.0
Class: 0x340408
Services: HFP, SyncML Server,
A2DP, AVRCP, PBAP (Client),
OBEX OPP, MAP MNS
Open ports: RFCOMM 1,4 and
L2CAP 1,3,23,25
Bluetooth version 2.0 means that vehicle
is using legacy pairing exclusively. Vehicle
produces dynamic 6 digit PIN. Device class
interprets to an audio/video hands-free device
Services include a Synchronization Markup
Language (SyncML) Server (for phonebook,
message and calendar information synchroni-
sation). A SyncML client could be used to
extract personal information that is stored
on the vehicle (although connections through
this were unstable - no information was
found).
Tests Outcome
D
a
ta
e
x
tr
a
c
ti
o
n AT Commands
Filesystem mount and directory
traversal
Responds to all AT commands sent on channel
4 with AT+BRSF=39. Commands on other chan-
nels end with errors such as 103, Software
caused connection abort.
No OBEXFTP, so filesystem cannot be
accessed through this vector.
D
e
n
ia
l
o
f
se
r
v
ic
e Flood L2CAP ports
Repeated data push through OBEX
channels
Fuzz open RFCOMM channels
Two responsive L2CAP ports found, with
maximum transmission unit (MTU) size of
4096 and 242 respectively. Flooding of the
port with the larger MTU resulted in discover-
able mode disrupted intermittently when try-
ing to pair. Calls made had quality issues or
were dropped.
Additional observations
Time discoverable was limited to two minutes, and the user had to enable Bluetooth.
Audio and visual notice was given of successful pairing, and test device was added to
the paired list. User is not alerted to any of the attempted actions beyond pairing.
The vehicle recognised a spoofed device as one that has previously paired, although
authentication checks failed (probably due to incorrect location on the test laptop of
the link key acquired from a previously paired device).
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1-bit 11-bit 1-bit 1-bit 1-bit 1-bit 4-bit ≤ 64-
bit
16-bit 2-bit 7-bit 7-bit
SOF IDE RTR IDE r1 r0 DLC Data CRC ACK EOF IFS
Figure 9: CAN frame format [41]
Compromise branch in the attack tree as described in Figure 10.
Typically, messages that are sent into the OBD port are either raw Controller
Area Network (CAN) or diagnostic messages. These two areas of intra-vehicular
communications are introduced below.
4.2.1. CAN Messages
The CAN protocol is the primary mode of communication inside the vehicle.
The latest version is CAN 2.0, first specified in 1991 [41] and embodied as an
ISO standard (ISO11898) in 2003. These CAN messages carry much of the
information needed for the operation and control of the vehicle.
The standard CAN packet comprises (up to) 11 bits for the message ID,
followed by (up to) 8 bytes of data, then a cyclic redundancy check (16 bits) for
error detection. The full frame format is given in Figure 9, with descriptions of
each segment in Table 5. The extended CAN frame format uses 29 bits instead
for the message ID with slightly different configurations of bits to allow for this.
We concentrate here on the standard CAN message only. The full 8 bytes of
data need not be used. Information for a door sensor, for example, may only
require 1 bit. Conversely a message can be spread across many frames, with
various data lengths and offsets.
Arbitration, should nodes on the CAN network transmit simultaneously, is
based on message prioritisation. This prioritisation is determined using the
message ID, with the lowest ID being the highest priority. That being the
case, implementation usually means that mission-critical messages are the ones
assigned lower IDs.
Assignment of IDs along with data payload is manufacturer specific, how-
ever, reuse is common to save on the cost of redesigning a network [2]. Although
CAN data is not typically encrypted, reverse engineering can be a difficult pro-
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Acronym Description
SOF Start of File
IDE The Identifier Extension establishes the priority of
the message. The lower the binary value of the ID,
the higher its priority. A CAN message frame with
an 11-bit ID is a standard frame. One with a 29-bit
ID is an extended frame.
RTR Remote Transmission Request; if this bit is dom-
inant (i.e. 0), more information is necessary from
another node
r0/r1 Reserved bits originally, but now in use in some im-
plementations to identify XOR masked CAN mes-
sages
DLC The Data Length Code contains the number of
data bytes to be transmitted
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check for error detection
ACK The Acknowledge bit is overwritten (from recessive
(1) to dominant (0)) to acknowledge validity
EOF End of File
IFS The interframe space contains time required to
move a received frame to the message buffer area
Table 5: CAN frame format descriptions [41]
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cess considering the volume and variety of content that is transmitted. This is
especially the case without a CAN database, which contains definitions for ev-
ery message and signal. This file is often highly confidential. However, specific
CAN messages for discrete events (such as unlocking doors) can be obtained in
a relatively straightforward manner through trial and error experiments.
CAN data is transmitted on a CAN network (in a bus configuration). There-
fore any Electronic Control Unit (ECU) on the network has access to all mes-
sages. There is no addressing; instead each ECU is programmed to listen to a
set of CAN IDs, which triggers some pre-determined functionality.
4.2.2. Diagnostic Messages
Parameter IDs (PIDs) are used to perform diagnostic functions or request
data from the vehicle specifically through the OBD-II port. This is done through
a query-response mechanism, where a PID query comprises the CAN ID 7DF,
followed by 8 data bytes. The first byte is the data length (usually 02) with
the second byte being the mode and the third byte typically being the PID.
The combination of modes and PIDs can then be sent into the CAN bus, and a
response should be received from whatever in-vehicle module is responsible (if
any). The response CAN ID is typically 8 (in hex) higher than the message ID
that the responding ECU answers to. A response of NO DATA usually indicates
that the vehicle has not returned anything, a response beginning with 7F in byte
2 means that the vehicle does not recognise the request.
The first ten modes (01 to 0A, described in SAE J1979 (E/E Diagnostic
Test Modes) [42], are standard and generic to all compliant vehicles. In these
standard modes, the PID is only the 2nd byte, with the 3rd to 8th byte unused.
With non-standard modes, the PIDs could extend to the 3rd byte. Manufac-
turers, are not obliged to implement all standard commands, and additionally
could also define functions for non-standard PIDs. There is much information
that could be gathered using PIDs to interrogate the vehicle. For example,
sending the mode 09 with PID 02 retrieves the Vehicle Identification Number
(VIN). The VIN is unique to the vehicle and is used for many activities, from
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vehicle maintenance to recovery of a stolen vehicle.
Another set of (related) diagnostic messages called Unified Diagnostic Ser-
vice (UDS) messages are embodied in ISO 14229-1 (Road Vehicles - Unified
Diagnostic Services) [43]. This standard specifies the requirements for diagnos-
tic services independent of the data link connection between vehicle and remote
device.
Like the J1979 OBD-II messages, UDS works to a request-response system.
Particular service IDs (SIDs) are sent to the vehicle (more specifically to ECUs
that support a particular service) in order to trigger a pre-determined function-
ality, whether that be to start a Diagnostic Management Session, interrogate
UDS-compatible ECUs or reset the ECU. Again, although the standard de-
termines what some of the UDS messages do (such as the ones given in the
examples above), manufacturers are able to define their own SIDs.
4.2.3. Setup
We concentrate on what combinations of diagnostic or CAN messages might
cause a reaction. We describe below the setup of the systematic evaluation of a
vehicle through an attached Bluetooth-enabled OBD-II device.
The OBDLINK MX dongle was connected to a single test vehicle. This
particular device was chosen as we could be sure that the chip was not coun-
terfeit and able to accept the full AT command set (a full list of supported
commands can be found in ELM’s AT command list [44]). Physical setup was
the same as that of the case study. From here the proof-of-concept tool used
a pre-determined attack tree (shown in Figure 10) to run through the entire
aftermarket device test suite.
Baudrate was set at 115200, which was the maximum based on the ELM
device (with the default connection being set at 9600). Time intervals for all
messages was set at 0.5 seconds in order to ensure that the OBD-II device had
time to read and transmit the data, although this is user customisable using
the proof-of-concept tool. Although a serial connection is slow compared to the
speed CAN busses could operate at (40Kbit/s to 1Mbit/s for high-speed CAN
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Figure 10: Attack tree used to test vehicles which have an aftermarket OBD-II device attached
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for example), the set interval was enough to be able to flood the bus with enough
messages to cause adverse reactions. Lower level bit-by-bit attacks, however,
would not be feasible using this method.
The systematic test was first performed with ignition on (but not engine),
with the assumption that, as long as the appropriate target ECUs were pow-
ered, that the vehicle would respond. Deciphering the content of the response
was considered out of scope at this point in time, as we had no manufacturer
CAN database available to interpret the CAN data acquired from the bus. The
experiments were then repeated with the engine on with the modes and PIDs
that either returned CAN data or caused a physical reaction from the vehicle.
Of the standard suite of modes, the vehicle returned information from in
three modes [42]:
• 01, which corresponds to “Show current data”;
• 06, which corresponds to “Test results, oxygen sensor monitoring for CAN
only” and
• 09, which corresponds to “Request vehicle information”
Of the non-standard suite of modes, the vehicle returned information for
nine different modes with all other modes returning NO DATA. Note that there
were modes and PIDs where the vehicle returned NO DATA, but that there was
a physical effect on the vehicle.
A summary of results can be seen in Table 6. Because non-standard modes
are manufacturer dependent, the exact modes and PIDs found to affect the
vehicle are not given.
Select raw CAN messages were also sent into the vehicle. These packets
were pre-determined through trial and error, but consisted of messages that
were known to cause an effect when trialled through a wired connection to the
OBD-II port. Unlike the diagnostic messages, some of the CAN messages sent
through only needed to be sent once. A summary of these results can be seen
in Table 7.
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Table 6: Results of systematic testing (Modes and PIDs)
Modes
found
Result Description
First mode CAN data
returned
for 2 PIDs
The first PID caused the headunit screen to display
“Diagnostics Mode On”, the second PID caused the
engine to refuse to start and the hazard lights (on
the cluster only) to flash, but required message flooding.
If engine is on, this causes the engine to stall.
Vehicle remains unresponsive thereafter as long as
message flooding continues. Once flooding stops, the
instrument cluster restarts but not the engine.
Second
mode
CAN data
returned
for 1 PID
The first PID had no physical effect, the second re-
turned NO DATA, but the electronics cut out, with the
instrument panel and ignition button non-responsive.
Third
mode
Not recog-
nised
7F returned by vehicle
Fourth
mode
CAN data
returned
for many
PIDs
12 of the PIDs each had 16 frames worth of CAN data
returned by the vehicle
Fifth mode Not recog-
nised
7F returned by vehicle
Sixth to
ninth mode
Not recog-
nised
7F returned by vehicle
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Table 7: Results of systematic testing (raw CAN messages)
Action Observation
Unlock doors Vehicle did not return any data, doors did not unlock, both
with key in-cabin or external to the vehicle
Sending Unified Diag-
nostic Service messages
Hazard lights came on, “crash” was displayed on the secondary
screen above the steering wheel. Vehicle doors continuously
locked and unlocked. The former happened if message is sent
once, the latter if message flooding is performed
Changing speed and
RPM indicators on the
instrument panel
CAN message flooding to this particular message ID caused
the needles to fluctuate
Disabling power steer-
ing
Successful, but only if the vehicle was stationary. This message
only needed to be sent once. Further message flooding had no
effect.
5. The Security Assurance Case
In this section, we discuss the classification of the results obtained (i.e. the
evidence) through systematic evaluations and the assignment of severity ratings
to this evidence. Methods used to acquire this evidence (i.e. test results) are
given in Tables 2 and 3. This follows the methodology as given in Section 3,
using the implementation as described in Section 3.4.2.
Recall that only the privacy and operational aspects of the EVITA classi-
fication scheme (see Section 3.4.2) were considered. The assignment of ratings
were based on the EVITA severity ratings (Section 2.2) and a rationale is given
for each of the ratings given.
5.1. Infotainment system
The severity ratings that were assigned for the data extraction and denial of
service attack goals are given in Figure 11 and Figure 12 respectively.
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Figure 11: Severity classification ratings for the data extraction test suite
The address, as a unique identifying factor of the headunit, could also be
used to track a vehicle. In terms of the Organisationally Unique Identity (OUI)
(which is the first three bytes of the Bluetooth address registered to a specific
manufacturer via IEEE), the fact that this organisation is known could then
lead to further reconnaissance (including research into known bugs or software
defects), which could lead to significant impairment. The operating system
could not be enumerated by the tool in this case, and so an automatic rating of
0 on both privacy and operational fronts was assigned. This could be adjusted
based on the results of manual observation.
The services discovered were all generic (no suggestive or bespoke services),
with no PAN services identified. This is based on tester observation (see Sec-
tion 3.4.2), although could be further automated based on a scan of the log
produced from the initial reconnaissance stage. This is all anonymous data
(Sp1), but operationally has no impact. Legacy pairing was identified, and so
given an actual operational rating of So1, since the impact is indiscernible, but
still presents a weakness. Potentially of course, the rating is much higher since
compromising the pairing could lead to any number of attacks (including against
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Figure 12: Severity classification ratings for the denial of service suite
privacy).
The presence of open ports meant that an actual operational rating of So1
was assigned, since this allowed us to acquire system information. However,
operationally, the right AT commands or number of packets to send could be
enumerated and this may result in a higher potential rating. Since there was no
OBEX FTP service on the vehicle, both the mounting and directory traversal
attacks were not carried out, and therefore both were automatically assigned
Sp0, So0 on all fronts.
The first sets of results from the denial of service tests in Figure 12 are
identical to the data extraction results since the reconnaissance aspects were
performed in the same vehicle. They are included in the figure for clarity. For
the purposes of the denial of service tests, only the last two set of results are
discussed.
Flooding caused no discernible impact, however, we were able to enumer-
ate the maximum transmission units of the open L2CAP ports on the vehicle,
therefore system information was available. This resulted in the assignment of
Sp1 (for anonymous data acquired), but since there was no discernible impact,
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the operational rating was set at So0. Potentially, however, further testing (with
more specific unit sizes, or with more packets or over a longer period of time)
could cause a denial of service in any number of Bluetooth functionalities in the
worst case scenario.
Likewise, stressing open RFCOMM ports caused no impact, although again
system information was required (even if it was the fact that the action was
forbidden) and therefore given the same rating as above. Potentially, finding
the right combination and length of malformed data could also cause denial of
service, and the ratings adjusted accordingly.
5.2. Aftermarket devices
Following the same process as testing through the native headunit connec-
tion (Section 4), the severity classification was created based on findings and
observations (recall that Sp is the privacy severity rating, and So the operational
severity rating). The table given in Figure 13 gives an overview of the severity
classification for each of the results in conjunction with manual observation for
tests performed with aftermarket devices.
Figure 13: Severity classification from tests with aftermarket devices
As can be seen from the results, no personal data was acquired. This was to
be expected since we are interfacing with the CAN bus and its connected ECUs,
rather than the infotainment system where any personal data is most likely to
be stored. Only system information was acquired, which is the reason for the
Sp1 ratings. This may not hold true in a worst case scenario as CAN traffic can
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be used to profile individual drivers through usage patterns [40]. Therefore the
potential privacy rating was set at Sp4.
The VIN number was also acquired, which allows for the identification of the
individual vehicle, as well as individual characteristics including make, model,
year of registration, airbag type and more. With this, vehicle tracking may also
be possible, as there are many online tools such as determining tax status that
makes use of this number.
Finally, the last characteristic deals with whether there was significant op-
erational effect on the vehicle. As could be seen from the case study as well as
from the systematic evaluation, almost anything is possible on the vehicle should
the correct CAN message be determined. Reverse engineering the right CAN
message (including any diagnostic messages) allows for significant operational
impairment of the vehicle, hence the potential indicator of So3.
Potentially, many of these devices (being small and the OBD-II port hidden
from general view) could be planted, and a signal sent to every device within
range. This led to the assignment of the potential indicator of Sp1 (for anony-
mous data acquired) and So4 (for possible significant impairment on multiple
vehicles - even simultaneously should they all be in range at once).
Like the classification before, prioritisation could take place depending on
the results. The edge cases of Sp0,So0 and any S4 rating could be dealt with
straightaway. The former could be used as evidence in a security assurance
case that there is low risk associated with that aspect of the component, or as
evidence that there are sufficient countermeasures in place. The latter (as it
affects multiple vehicles severely) would be a priority in any case.
The middle cases (S2 and S3 ratings and combinations thereof) would require
other factors weighting it to form priorities (see Section 6). Since we are testing
the internal CAN network here, operational factors might be given precedence,
as typically there is very little personal data available on the CAN bus.
Recall that validation of a black box with unknown inputs and no set of
expected outputs is very difficult. The black box nature also means that formal
verification is unfeasible due to lack of knowledge of internal behaviours. There-
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fore validation of this classification was also performed through domain expert
review.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
Results from the classification process can be used to inform further devel-
opment immediately.
The assigned security levels can be used to prioritize the development of
countermeasures. Anything that is classified as Sp0,So0 can be added to the
security assurance case as low risk, and therefore low priority. Conversely, any-
thing with a classification of S4 in any aspect can be targeted for the develop-
ment of countermeasures since this rating indicates a risk to multiple vehicles.
When the development of these countermeasures is considered complete, com-
parisons can be drawn with the initial rating, and if considered acceptably ad-
dressed, a description of these countermeasures can also be added to the security
assurance case as evidence of risk analysis and risk reduction.
Deciding precedence between equal but different classifications, such as Sp1,So2
and Sp2,So1 would depend, in part, on the components being targeted. These
tests are performed on the headunit where personal data is most likely to be
stored, so privacy might potentially be given more precedence. For example,
given the choice between Sp1,So2 and Sp2,So1, the latter might be the more
likely candidate to target for improvement. Conversely, the aftermarket device
is directly connected to the CAN network on which vehicle operations are highly
dependent, but personal data is highly unlikely to be found. Therefore the op-
erational rating would take precedence although this may be apparent anyway
as no identifying data would mean the privacy rating would only ever remain
at Sp1.
The above may seem intuitive given only two parameters, but in the event
where all four aspects of the EVITA classification scheme are in play, this could
aid in the decision making process.
Finally, the rationale given for the worst-case scenario (or the potential rat-
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ings) is intended to be a guideline to the starting point for either new test cases
based on the information acquired during the reconnaissance phase. Alterna-
tively, these can be used as guidance to what might be done by a malicious
adversary to complete the attack, since many of the tests pull up just short of
an invasive attack due to the risk to test vehicles.
6.1. Contribution
Our contribution is the process we present in this paper to classify results
(Section 3.1.3 and Section 3.1.4) of a systematic security evaluation using sever-
ity ratings.
This process could be integrated into the appropriate vulnerability testing
and penetration testing activities recommended by J3061 during the develop-
ment phases at the system, hardware and software levels. Each of the actual
(ACT) ratings (resulting from the actual tests) can be considered absolute rat-
ings, and could be augmented with additional risk assessment factors such as
cost of attack, ease of attack, opportunity available and knowledge of the at-
tacker at the discretion of the manufacturer. These additional factors were
considered out of scope within this paper.
The potential (POT) ratings could be treated in a similar way. Since they
represent worst case scenarios, they could feature in the threat analysis and
risk assessment activities recommended by J3061 during the concept phase, and
again, additional risk weighting factors could be defined by the manufacturer.
This ensures flexibility to deal with different implementations and concepts.
Once these classifications take place, they could be used as evidence in secu-
rity assurance cases not dissimilar to the proposed Automotive Security Assur-
ance Levels (ASEALs) [3] or the cybersecurity integrity levels proposed in [45].
Placing it in such a structured manner could also help scope the breadth and
depth of tests to be performed, in accordance with the priority of the testers or
the owners of the systems-under-test.
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6.2. Conclusion
In conclusion, the systematic Bluetooth evaluation carried out enumerated
manufacturer-specific implementation details regarding both the information
and entertainment system as well as through the diagnostics port. We were able
to affect the vehicle by injecting both OBD-II specific and raw CAN messages.
Once testing was completed, severity ratings that were assigned could be
used to prioritise development of countermeasures and to add evidence to a
security assurance case. The rationale behind the worst-case scenario ratings
could be used as guidance for further tests. A severity classification for these
results was validated using domain expert review. Finally the wider issues of
Bluetooth discoverability, and what manufacturers could consider to counter
these dangers was briefly explored.
Future work includes extending the proposed test result classification to
include both the safety and financial aspects of the severity classification. An
extension of the methodology by including additional risk factors such as attack
cost or difficulty would also mean that a more granular classification could be
achieved. The question of how a feedback loop may be formed to the early stage
threat analysis and risk assessment should also be addressed. This question
highlights the need to consider security by design, and investigations into the
precise points in the design and implementation process this could be added
would be desirable.
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